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Abstract—Wireless physical-layer security is an emerging field
of research aiming at preventing eavesdropping in an open
wireless medium. In this paper, we propose a novel waveform
design approach to minimize the likelihood that a message
transmitted between trusted single-antenna nodes is intercepted
by an eavesdropper. In particular, with knowledge first of the
eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI), we find the
optimum waveform and transmit energy that minimize the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the output of
the eavesdropper’s maximum-SINR linear filter, while at the
same time provide the intended receiver with a required pre-
specified SINR at the output of its own max-SINR filter. Next,
if prior knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable,
we design a waveform that maximizes the amount of energy
available for generating disturbance to eavesdroppers, termed
artificial noise (AN), while the SINR of the intended receiver is
maintained at the pre-specified level. The extensions of the secure
waveform design problem to multiple intended receivers are also
investigated and semidefinite relaxation (SDR) -an approximation
technique based on convex optimization- is utilized to solve the
arising NP-hard design problems. Extensive simulation studies
confirm our analytical performance predictions and illustrate
the benefits of the designed waveforms on securing single-input
single-output (SISO) transmissions and multicasting.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, broadcast channel, eavesdrop-
ping, physical-layer security, power allocation, semidefinite re-
laxation, signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, SISO wiretap
channel, waveform design.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE broadcast nature of the wireless medium makeswireless networks ubiquitously accessible and inherently
non-secure. An eavesdropper within range of a wireless trans-
mission may intercept the transmitted signal while staying
undetected. Commonly used security methods rely on cryp-
tographic (encryption) and steganographic (covert commu-
nication) means employed at upper layers of the wireless
network. It is still highly desirable, however, to enhance
the core security of wireless communications by reducing
the likelihood that propagating signals are intercepted by
eavesdroppers in the first place. As a result, there has been
growing interest recently in the development of physical layer
security mechanisms for the wireless link.
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A classical physical-layer secrecy setting was introduced
in Wyner’s seminal work [1] in the form of two single-
input single-output (SISO) channels, transmitter-to-intended-
receiver and transmitter-to-eavesdropper. The Wyner Gaussian
wiretap channel was a first example of an information-theoretic
security framework that demonstrated the possibility of secure
communications at the physical layer. If the eavesdropper’s
channel is a degraded version of the channel of the in-
tended receiver, perfectly secure communication between the
transmitter and the intended receiver is possible with non-
zero rate. Later on, the studies on secrecy capacity were
extended to the cases of secure communications over SISO
fading channels [2]-[7], Gaussian broadcast channels [8],[9],
and Gaussian multiple access channels [10],[11]. Motivated
by emerging wireless communication applications with mul-
tiple antennas, there has been recently a flurry of interesting
studies of information-theoretic secrecy capacity for multiple-
input multiple-output MIMO channels [12]-[16], single-input
multiple-output (SIMO) channels [17], and multiple-input
single-output (MISO) channels [18]-[20]. Practical applica-
tions of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes to the wiretap
channel problem were considered in [21]-[23].
While many works focus on information-theoretic aspects
and calculation/analysis of the achievable secrecy capacity,
there is growing interest from the signal processing perspective
to provide actual algorithmic security solutions that weaken
the eavesdroppers’ intercepted signal and materialize -at least
partly- the information theoretic secrecy capacity promises.
Secret transmit (and receive) beamforming designs [24]-[29]
which utilize the spatial degrees of freedom can enhance
the physical layer secrecy of wireless communications by
crippling eavesdroppers’ interception efforts as much as pos-
sible, while simultaneously guaranteeing a certain Quality-of-
Service (QoS)/signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR)
at the intended receiver. In particular, [24]-[25] focused on
exploiting knowledge of the eavesdropper’s MISO/MIMO in-
stantaneous channel state information (CSI) to provide secure
communications. Since eavesdropper’s CSI is unlikely to be
available in many scenarios, the use of artificially injected
noise (AN) was considered [26]-[28]. AN-aided methods aim
to generate a disturbance signal that degrades the eaves-
dropper’s channel but does not affect the channel of the
intended receiver, thus enabling secure communication. AN-
aided methods can certainly be adopted for the case where
the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is known as well. In
[29], the transmit beamformer and AN spatial distribution were
jointly optimized according to the CSI of the intended receiver
2and the eavesdroppers, using a semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
algorithmic approach.
In this present work, we consider the core problem of secure
transmissions over a multipath SISO channel where both
transmitter and intended receiver have only one antenna. Other
than beamforming, which uses the spatial degrees of freedom
to weaken eavesdroppers’ receptions, we turn our attention
to waveform design -another meaningful idea in physical-
layer secrecy- which can exploit the temporal characteristics
of a multipath fading channel. To the best of our knowledge,
waveform design for secure transmissions over multipath SISO
channels has not been investigated in the literature before. Like
other signal-processing-based approaches [24]-[29], we will
use again SINR as the optimization metric to pursue physical-
layer security. In particular, with knowledge of eavesdropper’s
CSI, our objective is to find the optimum waveform and
transmit energy that minimize the SINR at the output of the
eavesdropper’s maximum-SINR linear filter, while at the same
time provide the intended receiver with a pre-specified SINR
at the output of its own maximum SINR filter1. It is also
interesting to point out that the design formulation described
above is similar to cognitive radio (CR) application problems
where protecting primary users from being interfered by
secondary users [30]-[35] parallels the problem of preventing
eavesdroppers from overhearing.
In the second part of this work, we study the case where
no information regarding the eavesdropper’s CSI is available
and AN-aided methods are adopted in the waveform design
problem. The studies are then extended to the scenario that
the transmitter is to broadcast secure data to multiple intended
receivers. We recognize that, regretfully, the waveform design
problem for secure multicasting is non-convex NP-hard, in
general. Yet, using SDR techniques we are able to develop a
realizable suboptimal solution with excellent secure multicast
system performance as demonstrated by simulation studies
included in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The secure
SISO transmission problem is formulated in Section II. Se-
cure waveform designs are developed in Section III for one
intended receiver. We then extend the studies to the case
of multiple intended receivers in Section IV. In Section V,
simulation results illustrate our developments and, finally, a
few conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
The following notation is used throughout the paper. Bold-
face lower-case letters indicate column vectors and boldface
upper-case letters indicate matrices; C is the set of all complex
numbers; ()T and ()H denote the transpose and transpose-
conjugate operation, respectively; IL is the L × L identity
matrix; Re{·} denotes the real part of a complex number;
sgn{·} denotes zero-threshold quantization; and E{·} repre-
sents statistical expectation. X ≻ 0 and X  0 state that
X is positive definite and positive semidefinite, respectively;
Tr{X} is the trace of X. Finally, |·| and ‖·‖ are the magnitude
and norm of a scalar and vector, respectively.
1To the extend that the bit-error-rate (BER) of the eavesdropper’s receiver
is monotonically decreasing in SINR, minimization of SINR corresponds to
maximization of the BER of the eavesdropper toward the 1/2 value.
Fig. 1. SISO transmission system of a transmitter (Alice), an intended
receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve). All received signals exhibit
multipath Rayleigh fading.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless transmission to an intended receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropper who is able to overhear the
transmitted signal. For convenience, we follow the common
-whimsical- language in the field and name the transmitter,
intended receiver, and eavesdropper, Alice, Bob, and Eve,
respectively. A simple diagram is shown in Fig. 1 to illustrate
this basic communication scenario.
Alice will be attempting to transmit confidential messages
to Bob securely with the aid of an appropriately crafted
waveform. The transmitted signal is
u(t) =
∞∑
n=0
√
Eb(n)s(t− nT )ej2pifct (1)
where fc is the carrier frequency, b(n) ∈ {±1}, n = 1, 2, . . .,
is the nth transmitted information bit, E > 0 represents
transmitted energy per bit with bit period T , and s(t) is the
unit-energy (∫ T0 |s(t)|2dt = 1) complex continuous waveform
of the form
s(t) =
L−1∑
l=0
s(l)ψ(t− lTc) (2)
where s(l) ∈ C, l = 0, 1, . . . , L − 1, are to be de-
signed/optimized and ψ(t) is the continuous pulse shaper
function with duration Tc = T/L assumed to be given
and fixed (for example, ideal square pulse, raised cosine, or
otherwise).
The transmitted signal is modeled to propagate to Bob
and Eve over SISO multipath Rayleigh fading channels and
experience additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and inter-
ference -potentially- from other concurrent users. The com-
bined received signal to Bob (subscript b) or Eve (subscript e)
over individual multipath fading channels of impulse response
hb/e(t) is
yb/e(t) = hb/e(t) ∗ u(t) + zb/e(t) + nb/e(t) (3)
where zb/e(t) is other user(s) interference and nb/e(t) is white
Gaussian noise. After carrier demodulation and ψ(·)-pulse
matched filtering over a presumed multipath extended data bit
period of LM = L+M − 1 pulses where M is the number of
3resolvable multipaths, the data vector yb(n) ∈ CLM received
by Bob takes the following general form
yb(n) =
√
Eb(n)Hbs + ib + zb + nb, n = 1, 2, . . . , (4)
where Hb ∈ CLM×L is the multipath channel matrix between
Alice and Bob
Hb ,


hb,1 0 . . . 0 0
hb,2 hb,1 . . . 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
hb,M hb,M−1 0 0
0 hb,M 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . hb,M hb,M−1
0 0 . . . 0 hb,M


(5)
with entries hb,m ∈ C, m = 1, . . . ,M , considered as com-
plex Gaussian random variables to model fading phenomena,
ib ∈ CLM denotes multipath induced inter-symbol-interference
(ISI), zb ∈ CLM represents comprehensively interference to
Bob from other potential concurrent transmitters, and nb is
a zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector
with autocorrelation matrix σ2b ILM . The information bits b(n)
are handled as binary equiprobable random variables that are
independent within the data stream (i.e., in n = 1, 2, . . .).
Since the effect of ISI is, arguably, negligible for applications
of interest where the number of resolvable multipaths M is
much less than the number of pulses L, for mathematical and
notational convenience we will not consider the ISI terms
in our theoretical developments that follow2. Thus, Bob’s
received signal in (4) is simplified/approximated by
yb(n) =
√
Eb(n)Hbs+ zb + nb, n = 1, 2, . . . . (6)
Information bit detection at Bob is carried out optimally in
second-order statistics terms via linear maximum SINR filter-
ing (or, equivalently, minimum mean square error filtering) as
follows
b̂b(n) = sgn
{
Re{wHmaxSINR,byb(n)}
}
, n = 1, 2, . . . , (7)
where wmaxSINR,b = cR−1b Hbs ∈ CLM , c > 0, is the
maximum SINR filter and Rb , E{(zb + nb)(zb + nb)H} =
E{zbzHb } + σ2b ILM ≻ 0 is the autocorrelation matrix of
the combined total additive channel disturbance. Practically,
Rb can be estimated by averaging signal-absent observations
over N ≥ LM samples yb(n) in the absence of the signal
of interest, R̂b := 1N
∑N
n=1[zb(n) + nb][zb(n) + nb]
H
. If
interference zb from other concurrent users is not present,
Rb = σ
2
bILM and the maximum SINR filter becomes a simple
matched-filter wmaxSINR,b ≡ wMF,b = Hbs. The output
SINR of wmaxSINR,b can be calculated to be
SINRb ,
E{|wHmaxSINR,b(
√
EbHbs)|2}
E
{
|wHmaxSINR,b(zb + nb)|2
}
= EsHHHb R
−1
b Hbs = Es
HQbs (8)
where we define Qb , HHb R
−1
b Hb, Qb ≻ 0.
2However, naturally, ISI will be considered and accounted for in our
simulation studies.
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, Eve
can also hear the signal transmitted by Alice. Without loss
of generality and for simplicity in notation, we account the
multipath channels Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve to have the
same number of resolvable paths (M , that is). Then, the signal
vector received by Eve can be expressed as
ye(n) =
√
Eb(n)Hes+ ze + ne, n = 1, 2, . . . , (9)
where He ∈ CLM×L is the Alice-to-Eve channel matrix with
multipath channel coefficients he,m ∈ C, m = 1, . . . ,M , ze
is other-signals interference to Eve, and ne is AWGN.
We consider as a “worst-case” to Alice and Bob the scenario
under which Eve has perfect knowledge of the multipath
channel coefficients [he,1, . . . , he,M ] between Alice and Eve,
as well as of the waveform s used by Alice. Knowledge by Eve
of the waveform s and the Alice-to-Eve channel coefficients
[he,1, . . . , he,M ] allows Eve to carry out maximum SINR
filtering eavesdropping3. With this information, Eve attempts
to extract/retrieve message bits via her own linear maximum
SINR filter wmaxSINR,e ,
b̂e(n) = sgn
{
Re{wHmaxSINR,eye(n)}
}
, n = 1, 2, . . . , (10)
where wmaxSINR,e = cR−1e Hes ∈ CLM , c > 0, and Re ,
E{zezHe } + σ2eILM ≻ 0 is the autocorrelation matrix of the
total additive disturbance to Eve (which can also be sample-
average estimated). The output SINR of the filter wmaxSINR,e
is given by
SINRe ,
E{|wHmaxSINR,e(
√
EbHes)|2}
E
{
|wHmaxSINR,e(ze + ne))|2
}
= EsHHHe R
−1
e Hes = Es
HQes (11)
where we define Qe , HHe R−1e He, Qe ≻ 0.
From an information theoretic perspective, as long as
SINRb > SINRe there exists in theory a sequence of coding
schemes in increasing block-length such that, by adjusting
the transmitting energy appropriately, only Bob can perfectly
decode and obtain the message from Alice while Eve fails. In
a practical realistic secure wireless transmission application,
we wish that Bob can receive Alice’s signal at a minimum
required SINR level that corresponds to an acceptable BER,
while Eve can only have far, far inferior SINR reception
performance with, consequently, BER near 1/2. In the next
section, we attempt to lay the foundation for such a develop-
ment utilizing Alice’s transmit waveform vector s as a security
design parameter4.
3Knowledge by Eve of Bob’s channel [hb,1, . . . , hb,M ] would be of no
value to passive eavesdropping, which is the only security breach considered
in this present work.
4Our pre-detection SINR-based development approach is independent of
symbol alphabet sets and employed detectors. For simplicity and clarity in
presentation, we consider herein binary symbols b(n) ∈ {±1} (eq. (1))
and corresponding (optimal for Gaussian disturbance) zero-threshold detection
(eqs. (7), (10)).
4III. SECURE WAVEFORM DESIGN
A. Known Eavesdropper Channel
We first consider the scenario under which Alice/Bob know
Eve’s channel He and disturbance autocorrelation matrix Re.
This may be possible, for example, if the location of Eve is
known or projected/anticipated.
Our objective, in this case, is to find the transmission bit
energy E and the complex-valued normalized waveform s
used by Alice that minimize SINRe under the constraint that
Bob achieves its pre-determined SINR requirement γ > 0. I.e.,
we would like to identify the optimal pair
(E, s)opt = arg min
E>0, s∈CL
EsHQes (12)
s. t. EsHQbs ≥ γ , (13)
sHs = 1 , (14)
E ≤ Emax , (15)
where Emax denotes the maximum available/allowable bit
energy for the transmitter.
The constrained optimization problem (12)-(15) is non-
convex. It is easy to verify that (13) always holds with equality
at an optimal point. Therefore, for any given s, the optimal
transmitting energy can be calculated at
E =
γ
sHQbs
. (16)
By applying (16) to (12)-(15), the objective function can be
reformulated as having only s to be optimized,
sopt = arg min
s∈CL
sHQes
sHQbs
(17)
s. t. sHQbs ≥ γ
Emax
, (18)
sHs = 1 . (19)
Now, our problem is to find a normalized waveform vector
s to minimize the SINR ratio (generalized Rayleigh quotient)
SINRe
SINRb
= s
HQes
sHQbs
between Eve and Bob under constraint (18).
It is clear that constraint (18) may be satisfied and the opti-
mization problem is feasible/solvable, only if the maximum
eigenvalue of Qb is no less than γ/Emax. If we ignore
constraint (18) for a moment, then the waveform to minimize
the SINR ratio is the familiar generalized eigenvector solution
[36] given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let p1,p2, . . . ,pL be the generalized eigen-
vectors of matrices (Qe,Qb) with corresponding eigenvalues
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λL, i.e. Qepi = λiQbpi, i = 1, . . . , L. The
normalized waveform to minimize the generalized Rayleigh
quotient in (17) is the generalized eigenvector
s = pL (20)
with corresponding smallest eigenvalue (and attained mini-
mum quotient/ratio) λL. 
The eigen-design waveform in (20) is obtained with compu-
tational complexity O((L+M−1)3). It is the optimal solution
with Alice transmit energy E = γ/pHLQbpL, if s = pL
happens to satisfy (18), which is a common case. If, however,
(18) is not satisfied, we have to return to problem (12)-(15)
and examine its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions5. The
findings are summarized in the following proposition whose
proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 2: Consider the solvable (maximum eigenvalue
of Qb no less than γ/Emax) optimization problem (17)-(19)
and assume that solution (20) does not satisfy constraint (18).
Then, the following KKT conditions are necessary for an s to
be optimal
(Qe + µI)s = βQbs, β > 0, µ > 0, (21)
sHQbs =
γ
Emax
, (22)
sHs = 1 . (23)

While, unfortunately, we cannot have closed-form expres-
sions for s from the above KKT conditions, we can pursue an
efficient numerical solution by bisection. We reformulate (21)
as
((1− µ˜)Qe + µ˜I)s = β(1− µ˜)Qbs, β > 0, (24)
where µ˜ , µ1+µ , µ˜ ∈ [0, 1). Condition (24) indicates that
the optimal s is a generalized eigenvector of the matrices
((1 − µ˜)Qe + µ˜I, (1 − µ˜)Qb). For any given value of
µ˜ ∈ [0, 1), let qL(µ˜) denote the generalized eigenvector
of ((1 − µ˜)Qe + µ˜I, (1 − µ˜)Qb) that has minimum eigen-
value β(µ˜). We can easily verify that qHL (µ˜)QbqL(µ˜) is
strictly monotonically increasing in µ˜ ∈ [0, 1). Based on the
monotonicity and bounds on µ˜, we solve the KKT necessary
conditions (22)-(24) with bisection on µ˜ to a value µ˜opt such
that |qHL (µ˜opt)QbqL(µ˜opt)− γEmax | < ǫ where ǫ > 0 is a small
positive value serving as stopping threshold. The resulting
µ˜opt, β(µ˜opt), and sopt = qL(µ˜opt) values uniquely satisfy the
necessary conditions (22)-(24) and give the globally optimal
solution. While the optimization problem can also be solved by
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [43], our proposed generalized
eigen-decomposition based algorithm is direct in nature, easy
to implement (straight in the complex domain), and faster.
B. Unknown Eavesdropper Channel
In many applications it is impractical to assume that Al-
ice/Bob may have (continuously updated) information about
Eve’s channel and disturbance autocorrelation matrix Re. In
this case, the waveform design solution of the previous section
cannot be adopted due to lack of access to Eve’s SINR.
By common intuition, low-power Alice-to-Bob transmission
(“whispering”) improves security by making signal intercep-
tion by Eve more difficult since Eve’s SINR is proportional to
the transmitting energy. Alice, then, needs to use a waveform
s that minimizes the transmitting energy while Bob maintains
a given required QoS level
(E, s)opt = arg min
E>0, s∈CL
E (25)
s. t. EsHQbs ≥ γ , (26)
sHs = 1 , (27)
E ≤ Emax . (28)
5The strong Lagrangian duality of (12)-(15) was proven in [37].
5Mathematically, the optimization problem (25)-(28) is a spe-
cial case of (12)-(15) under Qe = αI, α > 0. The optimal
design to minimize the transmit energy is summarized by
the following proposition with straightforward derivation [38,
Theorem 4.2.2].
Proposition 3: Let q1,q2, . . . ,qL be the eigenvectors of
Qb with corresponding eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λL. The
waveform s to minimize transmitting energy is
s = q1 (29)
and the minimum transmitting energy is
Emin = γ/λ1. (30)

If Emin < Emax, Alice-to-Bob transmission can be es-
tablished with waveform s = q1 and transmitting energy
Emin = γ/λ1.
To further increase security by degrading Eve’s SINR, we
adopt an artificial-noise (AN)-aided approach. The maximum
(by the waveform design s = q1) remaining transmit energy
budget EAN = Emax − Emin will be utilized to insert
artificially generated noise to interfere to signal reception by
Eve only. Specifically, Alice shall transmit during the nth
symbol period her data signal
√
Eb(n)s along with artificially
generated noise w(n) of mean E{w} = 0, autocorrelation
matrix Rw , E{wwH}, and energy EAN = Tr{Rw}. Bob’s
received signal vector is then expressed as (compare to (6))
yb(n) =
√
Eb(n)Hbs+Hbw(n) + zb + nb, n = 1, 2, . . . .
(31)
With maximum SINR filtering by wmaxSINR,b = c(Rb +
HbRwH
H
b )
−1Hbs, c > 0, Rb , E{(zb + nb)(zb + nb)H},
the output SINR with AN is maximized to
SINRANb = Es
HHHb (Rb +HbRwH
H
b )
−1Hbs (32)
where the superscript AN is added to differentiate from
Bob’s SINRb in (8) when no AN is injected by Alice. The
autocorrelation matrix Rw of AN must now be designed by
Alice such that Bob’s SINR degradation due to AN is zero,
that is SINRb − SINRANb = 0.
By Woodbury’s matrix inversion lemma [39],
(Rb +HbRwH
H
b )
−1 =
R−1b −R−1b HbRw(I+HHb R−1b HbRw)−1HHb R−1b
and (32) can be rewritten as
SINRANb = Es
HHHb R
−1
b Hbs−
EsHHHb R
−1
b HbRw(I+H
H
b R
−1
b HbRw)
−1HHb R
−1
b Hbs
(33)
where the first term is Bob’s SINR without AN (see (8)) and
the second term quantifies Bob’s SINR degradation due to AN.
To make the second term (degradation) in (33) equal to zero,
it suffices to design AN with autocorrelation matrix Rw such
that
sHHHb R
−1
b HbRw = s
HQbRw = 0
T (34)
where 0 is the L× 1 all zero vector.
Fig. 2. Secure multicast system model of a transmitter, K intended receivers,
and an eavesdropper (all received signals exhibit multipath Rayleigh fading).
It is easy to see that, to achieve equality in (34) with wave-
form design s = q1, we should have Rw = WΣWH with
W , [q2, . . . ,qL], L ≥ 2, and Σ ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) a diagonal
matrix with Tr{Σ} = EAN . This means that AN w(n) must
be chosen as a linear combination of the L − 1 eigenvectors
q2, . . . ,qL. With unknown eavesdropper’s CSI, the best option
available to Alice is to isotropically/uniformly spread the
available transmit energy budget EAN = Emax−Emin along
the L− 1 eigen dimensions orthogonal to s = q1 to interfere
with the eavesdroppers’ receiver. Therefore, AN is generated
with the following autocorrelation matrix
Rw =
Emax − Emin
L− 1 WW
H . (35)
The task of weakening Eve’s SINR (subject to meeting Bob’s
QoS requirements) is now complete at a best effort basis by
the AN approach when neither instantaneous nor statistical
CSI of Eve is available.
IV. SECURE MULTICASTING
Multicasting is an efficient method of supporting group
communication by allowing simultaneous transmission of the
same information to multiple destinations. In the scenario of
(secure) multicasting shown in Fig. 2, Alice intends to transmit
securely the same data stream to multiple receivers (K Bobs)
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). With K Bobs to be
served, the received signal of each Bob is denoted by
yb,k(n) =
√
Eb(n)Hb,ks+ zb,k + nb,k,
k = 1, . . . ,K, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
where Hb,k ∈ CLM×L is the channel matrix from Alice to
Bob-k with multipath channel coefficients hb,k,m ∈ C, m =
1, . . . ,M , and zb,k is compound interference to Bob-k. Similar
to the developments in the previous section, the output SINR
of Bob-k’s maximum SINR filter is
SINRb,k = Es
HQb,ks
where Qb,k , HHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,k, Rb,k , E{(zb,k + nb,k)(zb,k +
nb,k)
H}. Eve’s received signal model is the same as in (9)
and the output SINR of Eve’s maximum SINR filter is as in
(11).
6If we consider sum-SINR, which is defined as the sum of the
individual SINRs of the K intended receivers, as a multicast
performance metric,
SINRsum ,
K∑
k=1
SINRb,k = Es
H
(
K∑
k=1
Qb,k
)
s = EsHQ˜bs,
Q˜b ,
∑K
k=1Qb,k, then the presented secure waveform de-
sign problem is similar to (12)-(15) and can be solved by
the algorithm developed in the previous section. Arguably,
however, sum-SINR may not be an appropriate performance
measure of choice, since no form of fairness/performance
assurance among receivers can be guaranteed. Therefore, we
turn our attention to the more difficult version of the problem
that involves individual constraints by which each intended
receiver has its own SINR requirement γk, k = 1, . . . ,K .
We investigate secure waveform design for the known and
unknown eavesdropper channel case.
A. Known Eavesdropper Channel
Our objective is to find the transmission bit energy E
and the complex-valued normalized waveform vector s that
minimize SINRe = EsHQes under the constraints SINRk =
EsHQb,ks ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K ,
(E, s)opt = arg min
E>0, s∈CL
EsHQes (36)
s. t. EsHQb,ks ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (37)
sHs = 1 , (38)
E ≤ Emax . (39)
The optimization task of minimizing the quadratic objective
function (36) subject to the K > 1 constraints in (37) and
(38), (39) is, unfortunately, a non-convex NP-hard (in L)
optimization problem. In the following, we delve into the
details of the problem and derive a realizable suboptimum
solution.
To effectively approach the problem, we first let x ,
√
Es
denote the amplitude-including transmitted waveform vector.
Then, the optimization problem in (36)-(39) can be rewritten
as
x′ = argmin
x∈CL
xHQex (40)
s. t. xHQb,kx ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (41)
xHx ≤ Emax . (42)
This optimization problem is in general a non-convex quadrat-
ically constrained quadratic program (non-convex QCQP) and
the complexity of a solver of (40)-(42) is exponential in the
dimension L (NP-hard problem). To circumvent this difficulty,
we first observe that if we use the trace property of matrices,
we are able to represent the objective function in (40) as
xHQex = Tr{QeX}, X , xxH . (43)
Thus, with X = xxH , the optimization problem in (40)-(42)
takes the new equivalent matrix form
X′ = arg min
X∈CL×L
Tr{QeX} (44)
s. t. Tr{Qb,kX} ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (45)
Tr{X} ≤ Emax , (46)
X  0 , (47)
rank(X) = 1 . (48)
The re-formulated design problem is, of course, still NP-
hard in general. To deal -or better say avoid- this issue,
we relax/drop the rank constraint in (48) and solve the
simplified version by semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [40]. The
relaxed problem is a convex polynomial-complexity problem
whose optimal solution can be efficiently obtained by avail-
able interior-point algorithms, for example the off-the-shelf
solvers [41], [42]. The worst-case computational complexity
is O((L+M − 1)4.5log(ǫ)) for a given minimization solution
accuracy ǫ > 0.
When X′ returned by the solver happens to be of rank-
16 with (eigenvalue, eigenvector) pair (λ1, a1), then xopt =√
λ1a1 and, consequently, Eopt = λ1 and sopt = a1 for the
original problem (36)-(39). If the rank ofX′ is not one, there is
no direct path to extract (E, s)opt fromX′ and a Gaussian ran-
domization procedure [40] can be employed to turn the SDR
solution to an approximate solution to (36)-(39). In particular,
we can draw now a sequence of samples x1,x2, . . . ,xN from
N (0,X′), i.e. Gaussian random variables with 0 mean and
covariance matrix X′. We first apply rescaling
x′i =
(
max
k=1,...,K
γk
xHi Qb,kxi
)
xi, i = 1, . . . , N, (49)
and then test all x′i for “feasibility” on the constraints (41) and
(42). Among the feasible vectors (if any), we choose the one,
say x′(0), with minimum x′HQex′ objective function value.
Consequently, Eopt and sopt for problem (36)-(39) are set to
Êopt = |x′(0)|2 and ŝopt = x′(0)/|x′(0)|, respectively.
B. Unknown Eavesdropper Channel
For the unknown eavesdropper channel case, we pursue
again the artificial-noise (AN)-aided method. To maximize the
available energy to generate AN, we first aim at minimizing
the transmitting energy while, still, each Bob’s SINR is no
less than a threshold γk,
(E, s)opt = arg min
E>0, s∈CL
E (50)
s. t. EsHQb,ks ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (51)
sHs = 1 , (52)
E ≤ Emax . (53)
This NP-hard problem can also be approximately solved by
SDR (with randomization) after reformulating (50)-(53) in
6By Lemma 3.1 in [43], the SDR solution can always be made to have
rank-one when K ≤ 2.
7matrix form to
X′ = arg min
X∈CL×L
Tr{X}
s. t. Tr{Qb,kX} ≥ γk, k = 1, . . . ,K,
Tr{X} ≤ Emax ,
X  0 ,
where X , xxH , x ,
√
Es. After obtaining the optimal
waveform s and the minimum energy Emin via the sole
eigenvector of X′ or an approximate solution via (49) as
before, we turn our attention to the design of AN with the
residual energy Emax − Emin.
We recall the results from (31)-(33) that, when Alice trans-
mits AN w(n) along with the information bearing signal, the
output SINR of Bob-k’s maximum SINR filter is
SINRANb,k = Es
HHHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,ks− EsHHHb,kR−1b,kHb,kRw
(I+HHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,kRw)
−1HHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,ks,
k = 1, . . . ,K.
To ensure that AN will not degrade the SINR of any Bob, AN
should be designed with autocorrelation matrix Rw such that
sHHHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,kRw = 0
T , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K. (55)
Set vk , HHb,kR
−1
b,kHb,ks, k = 1, . . . ,K , and V ,
[v1, . . . ,vK ]. To achieve the equalities in (55), we need L ≥
K+1 and require that Rw ⊥ V. Let ui, i = 1, . . . , L, be left
singular vectors ofV with singular values λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥, . . . , λL.
Isotropical AN should be designed with autocorrelation matrix
Rw =
Emax − Emin
L−K WW
H
where W , [uK+1, . . . ,uL].
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present simulation results that show the
average SINR and bit-error-rate (BER) of Eve for various
target performance levels of Bob, lengths of waveform L,
and total energy constraints. In all simulations, the channel
is assumed to be multipath fading with M = 3 resolvable
paths with additive interference from concurrent users and
white Gaussian noise. The multipath coefficients are taken to
be independent complex Gaussian random variables of mean
zero and variance 1/M . In each channel realization, a number
of concurrent users is randomly selected between 5 and 10;
for each concurrent user, the energy per-bit is uniformly
drawn from [1, 4] and a normalized waveform of length L is
arbitrarily generated from the zero-mean Gaussian distribution
and placed on the same carrier fc as Alice’s signal. Finally,
the white Gaussian noise autocorrelation matrix at both Bob
and Eve is set at IL+2 (identity matrix of size L+ 2)7.
First, Alice attempts to establish a secure transmission to
Bob using a waveform of length L = 8 in the presence of
eavesdropper Eve. The available transmit energy is assumed
7Bob’s and Eve’s channel are then originally statistically equivalent in the
study.
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Fig. 3. Average SINR of Eve versus SINR requirement of Bob γ (Emax =
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Fig. 4. Average SINR of Eve versus SINR requirement of Bob γ (Emax =
100, L = 16).
to be Emax = 100. Three schemes are examined under varying
assumptions about Eve’s CSI: i) Generalized eigenwaveform
of Section III.A (known CSI); ii) artificial noise (AN) injection
of Section III.B (no CSI); and iii) as a reference line, minimum
required energy transmission (no CSI, no AN). The average
pre-detection SINR of Eve over 106 channel realizations is
plotted in Fig. 3 as a function of Bob’s pre-detection SINR
requirement γ, which is set to range from 0dB to 10dB. It can
be observed from Fig. 3 that, for the case of known CSI, the
generalized eigenwaveform design keeps the SINR of Eve at
lowest values and provides effectively secure transmission to
Bob8. For unknown CSI, the AN-aided method degrades Eve’s
SINR by about 2dB over the no-AN approach and maintains
8The transmission can be called perfectly secure if Eve’s SINR is zero or,
equivalently, when her BER is 1/2. This ideal security performance bound
may not be achieved with practical system settings, for example the short
waveform length in our SISO transmission. Nonetheless, the proposed design
provides highly effective near-optimal security, especially when the waveform
length grows to L = 16 (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 5. (a) Probability of solvability of the generalized eigenwaveform
optimization problem versus Bob’s SINR constraint γ (Emax = 100); (b)
average available energy (%) for artificial noise creation versus Bob’s SINR
constraint γ (Emax = 100).
a significant Bob-to-Eve SINR margin of 6dB to 8dB. In Fig.
4, we repeat the same study with a longer L = 16 waveform
(twice as many degrees of freedom). Comparing Fig. 4 to Fig.
3, we notice the much larger SINR gains on security even by
AN alone.
In Fig. 5, we collect some useful statistics on the ex-
periments of Figs. 3 and 4. We first, Fig. 5(a), calculate
the probability (frequency of occurrence) that the generalized
eigenwaveform optimization problem in (12)-(15) is solvable,
i.e. Bob’s SINR constraint γ can be satisfied by a waveform
design for the given Emax value. By Fig. 5(a), the problem is
almost always solvable with L = 16 and less likely solvable
with L = 8 9. In Fig. 5(b), we focus our attention on the
unknown Eve channel case and plot the average percentage
of available energy to create artificial noise. Again, L = 16
easily supports effective creation of AN even for large SINR
requirements for Bob.
To elaborate on the relationship between security perfor-
mance and waveform length, in Fig. 6 we fix Bob’s SINR
requirement at 6dB and plot the average SINR of Eve versus
waveform length L. While for known CSI and generalized
eigenwaveform design the average SINR of Eve continuously
decreases as L increases, this is not the case for unknown
CSI and AN injection. Waveforms with longer length can
reduce the transmit energy to satisfy Bob’s SINR requirement
and leave more residual energy to be used for generating
AN. Ironically, while the energy of AN can be increased
by employing a longer waveform, Eve’s ability to suppress
interference and noise is also enhanced10 due to the higher
space dimensions and her SINR may even increase. Therefore,
waveform length for the unknown CSI case must be selected
9When Alice is to transmit with an optimal generalized eigenwaveform and
no solution exists, Alice shall not transmit to prevent eavesdropping breach.
10Of course, herein, we follow the conservative approach by which Eve is
supposed to have exact knowledge of Alice’s waveform.
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Fig. 7. Average SINR of Eve versus total transmit energy constraint Emax
(L = 16, γ = 6dB).
appropriately to balance the availability of AN energy to Alice
and space dimensions to Eve. Average SINR of Eve versus
energy constraint Emax is shown in Fig. 7. Obviously, for
the unknown CSI case with AN, the average SINR of Eve is
decreasing with higher energy constraint Emax, since more
residual energy can be used for generating AN.
To further quantify the practical effectiveness of the pro-
posed transmission scheme with secure waveform design, we
also evaluate the bit-error-rate (BER) of Bob and Eve for both
uncoded and coded transmissions. An (1024, 512) low-density
parity-check (LDPC) code11 with belief-propagation decoding
is adopted for the simulation experiments. Both Bob and Eve
perfectly know the coding scheme. The BER performance
11Punctured (weakened) LDPC codes were used in [21], [22] to support
security. SINR-based security optimization, as described in this present paper,
places intrinsically Bob in the “waterfall” region of the code while keeping
Eve “on the top.” Therefore, puncturing is unnecessary or even detrimental
to Bob’s relative performance with respect to Eve.
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Fig. 8. BER versus SINR requirement of Bob γ (Emax = 100, L = 8).
curves (L = 8) are shown in Fig. 8. While Bob can achieve
(by all practical measures) errorless transmission with LDPC
coding at SINR 2dB, Eve has error rate barely less than 1/2.
Now we turn to examine the performance of secure multi-
casting to multiple Bobs as described in Section IV. Similar
to the one-Bob studies, in Figs. 9 and 10 we show the average
SINR and BER, respectively, of Eve with the SDR-based
waveform designs. All K = 5 Bobs satisfy the same SINR
requirement γ1 = . . . = γ5, which is set to vary from 0dB to
10dB. It can be observed that the Bobs can achieve practically
errorless reception with the (1024, 512) LDPC code when their
SINR is at 2dB. Eve’s average BER is still too high (more than
10−1).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented waveform-based approaches to secure wire-
less transmissions between trusted (single-antenna) nodes in
the presence of an eavesdropper. We formulated the problem
as the search for the (transmit energy, waveform) pair that
minimizes the eavesdropper’s SINR subject to the condition
that the intended receiver’s SINR value is maintained at a given
required SINR level (QoS determined). A low-complexity,
highly-effective eigenwaveform and transmit energy design
was proposed. We, then, extended the waveform design prob-
lem to multiple intended receivers (secure multicasting). Re-
gretfully, the formulated multicasting optimization problem is
non-convex and NP-hard in the waveform dimension. Never-
theless, we employed semi-definite relaxation to reach compu-
tationally manageable and performance-wise appealing subop-
timal solutions. Extensive simulation experiments verified our
analytical performance predictions and illustrated the benefits
of waveform optimization for secure SISO transmission and
multicasting.
As a natural next step in future work, waveform-based
physical-layer security can be combined with the existing
successful beamform-based security works in MIMO systems
to carry out joint space-time security optimization. We can
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Fig. 9. Average SINR of Eve versus SINR requirement of Bobs γ (Emax =
100, L = 16, multicast to K = 5 Bobs).
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harness, then, the product of space (number of antennas)
and time (waveform dimension) degrees of freedom (DoF) to
secure the link.
APPENDIX - PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We start with the original problem (12)-(15). We combine
the function to be optimized with the constraints and form the
Lagrangian
L = EsHQes+β(γ−EsHQbs)+µ(E−Emax)+λ(sHs−1)
(56)
where β ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, and λ are KKT multipliers. The KKT
necessary conditions of the optimization problem consist of
∂L
∂sH
= EQes− βEQbs+ λs = 0, (57)
∂L
∂E
= sHQes − βsHQbs+ µ = 0, (58)
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the complementary slackness conditions, and the primal con-
straints
β(γ − EsHQbs) = 0 , (59)
µ(E − Emax) = 0 , (60)
EsHQbs ≥ γ , (61)
sHs = 1 , (62)
E ≤ Emax . (63)
We first examine the above KKT conditions for the cases
β = 0 and β > 0, separately. If β = 0, (58) becomes
sHQes + µ = 0 (64)
which cannot be satisfied since µ ≥ 0 and sHQes > 0.
Therefore, we must have β > 0 and
EsHQbs = γ ⇒ E = γ
sHQbs
. (65)
We reach the equivalent problem (17)-(19).
After applying (65) to the original KKT necessary con-
ditions, we obtain the KKT necessary conditions for the
equivalent problem (17)-(19) as follows
Qes− βQbs+ λ(sHQbs/γ)s = 0, (66)
sHQes− βsHQbs+ µ = 0, (67)
µ(γ/sHQbs − Emax) = 0, (68)
sHs = 1, (69)
sHQbs ≥ γ
Emax
. (70)
Left multiplying both sides of (66) by sH , we have
sHQes− βsHQbs+ λ(sHQbs/γ) = 0. (71)
Combining (67), (69), and (71), we have λ(sHQbs/γ) = µ
and then (66) can be rewritten as
(Qe + µI)s = βQbs. (72)
For µ = 0, (72) becomes
Qes = βQbs (73)
that implies that the optimal waveform s is a generalized
eigenvector of the matrices (Qe,Qb). If the solution satisfies
constraint (70), then it is the optimal solution; if not, then we
turn to examine case µ > 0. When µ > 0, to satisfy (68),
we must have γ/sHQbs − Emax = 0, and consequently (68)
and (70) together become sHQbs = γEmax . Then, the KKT
necessary conditions are (72), together with β > 0, µ > 0,
and the constraints sHRbs = γEmax , s
Hs = 1. The proof of
Proposition 2 is complete. 
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